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Abstract
As with other commodities, electricity is often traded on both forward and spot
markets. This was initially true in the restructured California electricity industry
from 1998 to 2000. Though the power traded in the forward and spot markets
was for delivery at the same times and locations, prices often diﬀered in signiﬁcant
and predictable ways. We consider several explanations for this apparent ineﬃciency,
concluding that uncertainty about regulatory penalties for trading in the spot market
caused most ﬁrms to avoid trading on inter-market price diﬀerences. The few ﬁrms
that did carry out these trades did not ﬁnd it proﬁt-maximizing to eliminate the
price diﬀerences. Skyrocketing prices in the summer of 2000, however, changed the
major buyers’ (utilities’) incentives and increased the price diﬀerentials between the
markets.
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1 Introduction
In product markets, it is well-understood that a ﬁrm that discovers a proﬁtable market
opportunity will generally maximize proﬁts by producing less than the quantity that would
drive price to the ﬁrm’s marginal cost. The parallel analysis for ﬁnancial markets suggests
that if one ﬁrm sees a proﬁtable trading opportunity, its trading will tend to reduce the
proﬁtability of the strategy, but it will not trade to the point that the marginal trade
by itself breaks even. Put diﬀerently, the ﬁrm will have market power in the trading
opportunity, though perhaps only brieﬂy, and will take into account its eﬀect on the
strategy’s proﬁtability when it decides how much trading to do.
For two reasons, market power in trading opportunities has seldom been analyzed.1
First, most opportunities are open to a large enough set of potential traders that the
resulting equilibrium eliminates proﬁts on the marginal trade. Second, even if only one
ﬁrm can execute the trade, in most ﬁnancial markets the ﬁrm can trade sequentially at
diﬀerent prices. By making sequential small trades, it can eﬀectively price discriminate,
trading until the proﬁt on the marginal trade is zero. If either of these conditions hold,
persistent proﬁtable trading opportunities will not be observed in equilibrium.
In some cases, however, neither condition may hold. Institutional or legal constraints,
or asymmetric information, may limit the number of agents that recognize a trading oppor-
tunity and are in a position to exploit it. Market rules or design may make it diﬃcult for
a strategic trader to sequentially price discriminate in its trading.2 As a result, persistent
price diﬀerences may be observed.
We argue that the California electricity market, which operated from 1998 through
2000, presented such a case. Two major markets accommodated trading of power for
delivery at a speciﬁc location in a speciﬁc hour. Trading in the Power Exchange (PX)
took place the day before delivery while trading in the Independent System Operator’s
(ISO) real-time market took place at the time of delivery. The products traded were
identical, but we show that prices exhibited systematic and ex ante predictable diﬀerences
that presented proﬁtable trading opportunities. A variety of simple trading rules would
have yielded positive returns that appear to more than compensate for the associated
trading risk.
1The role of corporate raiders in takeover battles is one exception (see Grossman and Hart, 1980 and
Kyle and Vila, 1991).
2Zitzewitz (2003) considers the case of open-end mutual funds, where funds’ decisions about how to
price transactions can lead to proﬁtable trading opportunities. He argues that agency issues allow arbitrage
opportunities to persist in this case.3
Once we establish the existence of signiﬁcant price diﬀerences between the markets, we
address the plausible explanations for this phenomenon. In ﬁnancial markets, the most
common explanation is risk aversion. Indeed, some research refers to such price diﬀerences
as “risk premia” without addressing the alternative explanations we raise in this paper.3
We demonstrate that risk aversion is not a plausible explanation (a) because the direction
of the premium shifts between buyers and sellers from month to month, (b) because the
risk from trading on these expected price diﬀerences is highly diversiﬁable, and (c) because
the magnitude of the gains are very large relative to the variance of returns. Also, a “peso
problem” explanation — extreme outcomes that are possible, but not observed in the data
set — is not applicable here.4 Regulatory constraints on prices — both ﬂoors and ceilings
— limited the risk associated with such trading, and the most extreme prices permitted
actually occur in the dataset.
Transaction costs are the other common explanation for persistent price diﬀerences. Di-
rect trading costs were too small to plausibly explain the persistence of predictable price
diﬀerences of the magnitude we observe. Transaction costs considered more broadly, how-
ever, could explain why more market participants did not take advantage of the apparent
trading opportunity, and thus eliminate its proﬁtability. We document that restrictions on
speculative trading in these markets, and penalties for breaching those restrictions, were
unclear. Some traders appear to have believed that the California ISO and PX had given
tacit approval to such activities while others believed that they constituted a violation of
ISO and PX rules and would eventually lead to punishment. In fact, some individuals who
engaged in these trades have faced no repercussions. On the other hand, these trades were
included in the list of activities that were the basis for punishing traders at Enron.5
Beginning in the summer of 2000, the California markets experienced drastic price
increases. At the same time, the price diﬀerences between the ISO and PX widened, as
the ISO price came to persistently and dramatically exceed the PX price. Average day-
ahead prices in the Power Exchange were more than 15% below prices for the same product
in the real-time market of the ISO and, by September 2000, prices in the ISO were higher
than prices in the Power Exchange for over 70 percent of the hours.
We oﬀer an explanation for the timing of this change that is consistent with a limited
number of market participants that could individually inﬂuence the ISO-PX price diﬀer-
ence. By summer 2000, the incentives of the major buyers — two utilities in California —
3See Longstaﬀ and Wang (2004), who study the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland electricity market.
4Kaminsky (1993) studies a situation where the peso problem appears to be relevant.
5Unfortunately, none of the available data permit us to distinguish between fear of punishment and lack
of understanding as possible reasons that other market participants did not exploit this market ineﬃciency.4
had changed. Due to the structure of regulation, utilities were much more motivated to
reduce energy purchase costs than they had been in the previous two years. We present
both data and documentary evidence showing that the largest buyer in the market, Paciﬁc
Gas and Electric (PG&E), attempted to reduce its purchasing costs by exacerbating the
ISO-PX price diﬀerence in a way that reduced the price in the PX where PG&E carried
out most of its purchasing.
While the story of California’s electricity debacle is itself interesting, the implications of
our analysis extend beyond this particular market. Our analysis suggests that impediments
that reduce the number of ﬁrms that can take advantage of proﬁtable arbitrage trades can
give market power to those that do engage in such trades and, thus, result in persistent
price diﬀerences across markets.6 This weakens the ability of the forward market to provide
an accurate signal of market conditions in the spot market. Our analysis also suggests a
problem associated with using uniform-price auctions: they prevent ﬁrms from sequentially
trading away ineﬃcent price diﬀerences. It is also related to the ongoing policy debates
about whether traders without physical positions in a market should be allowed to trade
(see Saravia 2003).
In the next section, we describe the California forward and spot markets and some of
the institutional rules that aﬀected trading in them. Section 3 presents tests of integration
between the ISO and PX, showing that prices diﬀered signiﬁcantly and that some simple
and intuitive trading rules would have been proﬁtable. In Section 4, we discuss several
factors that could explain the price diﬀerences. We present evidence suggesting that the
price diﬀerences cannot be attributed to risk aversion, transaction costs or traders’ inability
to learn about the proﬁtable trading strategies in real time. We then go on to describe
both statistical and documentary evidence on the behavior of individual ﬁrms and their
beliefs about the markets. Our analysis suggests that the price diﬀerence persisted because
some ﬁrms had market power in the trading required to push the prices together.
2 The California Electricity Market
During the ﬁrst several years following electricity restructuring in California there were
many avenues through which agents could sell or purchase wholesale electrical energy.7
6Throughout the paper, we use the term “arbitrage” to include risky trades that have a positive
expected return, encompassing both risky and riskless trading strategies.
7For more detailed descriptions of the various markets and their timing, see Bohn, Klevorick, and
Stalon (1999) and Wolak, Nordhaus, and Shapiro (1998) and Borenstein, Bushnell, Knittel and Wolfram
(2004) (hereafter BBKW (2004)).5
Until December of 2000, most of the trading activity in California occurred on a day-
ahead basis for hourly transactions. The California Power Exchange (PX) ran the largest
of these day-ahead markets. The PX accepted supply and demand bids for each hour of
the following day. Bids were submitted for the day-ahead market by 7am on the day before
delivery.
In a ﬁrst-round calculation each day, the PX calculated day-ahead prices as if all
bids and oﬀers were in a common California-wide market. Limits on the capacity of
electricity transmission lines within California often necessitated further price adjustments.
Most importantly for our analysis, if the main transmission line between nothern and
southern California (the “NP15” and “SP15” zones) was congested, separate prices for
each zone were calculated based on bids submitted by market participants that reﬂected
their willingness to pay to use a congested transmission interface.
The designers of the California market envisioned that the bulk of all transactions
would be scheduled before the actual hour of delivery. However, since electricity is very
costly to store and demand is inelastic, the ISO had to ensure that supply and demand
remained in continuous balance by adjusting production. The ISO ran an “imbalance”
energy market to handle these real-time deviations. Like the PX, the ISO’s imbalance
energy market set a uniform price based upon the oﬀer price of the marginal supplier.
The forward markets have often been described as “physical” power markets, in the
sense that delivery of power was technically required to fulﬁll a transaction. During the
ﬁrst part of our sample period, however, there were no penalties explicitly associated with
this delivery requirement. A market participant whose delivery or consumption of power
deviated from its ﬁnal schedule was simply charged, or paid, the ISO imbalance energy
price for the hour in question depending on whether the participant turned out to be in a
short or long position in real time. In this sense, the day-ahead schedules were eﬀectively
ﬁnancial forward positions, and the ISO imbalance energy market was the underlying spot
market in which positions in these forward markets were resolved.
Throughout the study period, day-ahead trades accounted for an average of about
90% of total volume. In speciﬁc hours, however, the volume could be much lower. During
high demand periods in the last few months of our sample period, the real-time imbalance
energy market handled as much as 33% of total volume. This high level of real-time volume
raised concerns about system reliability and prompted debates over the merits of further
eﬀorts to discourage real-time transactions.
Besides passively supplying more than was scheduled, suppliers could sell power in the6
imbalance energy market by bidding oﬀers.8 Producers that bid into the imbalance energy
market could choose to oﬀer supply at a given price up to 45 minutes prior to the hour of
production. A supplier that simply generated in excess of its scheduled supply made that
decision on a real-time basis, with no advance commitment.
A supplier that was scheduled to provide energy in a forward market could also take
a short position in the spot market either by oﬀering to decrement its output through an
imbalance energy bid or by simply generating less than its advance commitment. In the
latter case, the supplier had to make up its production short-fall through a purchase on the
imbalance energy market and was eﬀectively a consumer in this market. A decremental
supply bid in the imbalance energy market was an oﬀer to buy out of an advance supply
commitment. A supplier paid the ISO an amount equal to the imbalance energy price
in exchange for not having to provide the energy that it had scheduled. By bidding a
decremental energy bid, a supplier had the opportunity to set the imbalance energy price,
and reserved the right to generate energy in the event that the imbalance energy price was
set above its decremental bid.
Consumers did not actively bid demand adjustments into the ISO imbalance energy
market. However, since there was little or no explicit penalty for deviating from scheduled
consumption, demand could passively take a position in the market simply by consuming
more or less than it was scheduled to consume.
2.1 Market Participants
Unlike more established commodity futures or forward markets, trading in the California
electricity market was intended to be restricted to the actual producers and purchasers
of electricity. As such, it was thought that trading would be restricted to hedging, and
not “speculative”, activity. Although, in reality, speculative trades were certainly possi-
ble, institutional barriers largely restricted such activity to the actual “physical” market
participants. After the market opened, further restrictions and institutional barriers were
applied in an eﬀort to limit speculative trades. These eﬀorts were motivated by a concern
that such trades might destabilize the system and negatively impact the reliability of the
network.
All market participants were supposed to present credible evidence of their ability to
physically deliver and consume all power scheduled through the ISO system, as well as the
8BBKW (2004) discusses the additional opportunity to supply real-time power in conjunction with
supplying reserve capacity. The existence of such reserve or ancillary service markets does not signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the analysis here.7
speciﬁc locations where this activity would occur. For engineering and practical reasons,
however, neither the ISO nor the PX could verify the credibility of demand or supply
in much detail. The formal restriction against ﬁnancial trades, combined with a limited
ability to enforce it, created barriers to entry for traders and endowed a degree of market
power on those ﬁrms willing to skirt the rules.
During a four year transition period starting in 1998, the three large investor-owned
utilities (IOUs) in the California ISO system were required to meet the demand needs of
their distribution systems through purchases in the PX: Paciﬁc Gas & Electric (PG&E) was
the major buyer in northern California (NP15), while Southern California Edison (SCE),
and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) constituted most of the demand in southern
California (SP15). This requirement was intended to help ensure suﬃcient liquidity in
the PX day-ahead market and to establish a transparent day-ahead price. Other market
participants were free to participate in other day-ahead markets, or sign direct bilateral
arrangements. Although there were roughly 60 ﬁrms trading in the PX, the three IOUs
accounted for about 90% of the energy purchases. The PX itself accounted for about 87%
of the total trading volume in the ISO system during the sample period.9
Although the IOUs were technically required to purchase all their supply needs from
the PX markets, the market process made rigid enforcement of this requirement both
impractical and undesirable. It has been well documented that demand bids into the PX
were downward sloping and in fact quite elastic over some price ranges.10 This is despite
the fact that nearly all of end-use demand was incapable of receiving, let alone responding
to, hourly price signals. Price-elastic demand bids in the PX clearly reﬂected strategic
decisions by buyers to purchase in the ISO real-time imbalance energy market if the PX
day-ahead price was too high. This was in part driven by the fact that the ISO imbalance
energy market was subject to a price cap that was at times binding during our sample
period, while PX prices were capped at a much higher level that was never binding. A
large part of the elastic portion of PX demand bid curves reﬂected the fact that no ﬁrms
were willing to pay more than the ISO energy price cap for power in a forward market,
since that was the maximum allowable price in the spot market.11
A large amount of energy supply in the California market was also committed to
bidding into the PX day-ahead market. This energy was supplied by generation sources
9See Bohn, Klevorick, and Stalon (1999), page 13.
10Bohn, Klevorick, and Stalon (1999).
11The ISO imbalance energy price was $250/MWh until October 1, 1999 when it was raised to
$750/MWh. It was subsequently lowered again in 2000 — to $500/MWh at the beginning of July and
$250/MWh on August 8.8
producing under regulatory or commercial arrangements that predated the restructuring
of the California market. The price earned by these producers was set by the terms of
their pre-existing “must-take” arrangements. This must-take supply, which could be as
much as 80% of the total supply in the market, was bid into the PX day-ahead market at
az e r op r i c e . 12
3 Price Relationships and Market Eﬃciency in Elec-
tricity Markets
In an eﬃcient commodity market with risk-neutral traders, all contracts — forward and
spot — for delivery of the good at the same time and location will, on average, transact at
the same price. For instance, a contract signed on June 9 for delivery of 10 megawatt-hours
(MWh) of power at 4pm on June 10 should bear a price that is an unbiased forecast of
the spot price for electricity at 4pm on June 10. If the forward price diﬀers systematically
from the spot price, this can be due either to risk aversion on the part of some traders in
t h em a r k e to rs o m ei m p e d i m e n to rc o s tt h a tp r e v e n t sf u l li n t e g r a t i o no ft h em a r k e t s . 13
If there are no transaction costs and all traders are risk neutral, then the price at time
t − j for delivery of power at time t incorporates all information available at t − j about
the expected spot price of electricity at t. That is,
t−jPt = E [tPt|Ωt−j]( 1 )
where Ωt−j is the information set available at t − j, the left subscript on price is the time
at which the contract is traded, and the right subscript indicates the designated time for
delivery of the power.
Equation (1) says that the forward price must be an unbiased predictor of the spot
price. It also implies that the forward price incorporates all information available at the
12In addition to the institutional and regulatory constraints on market participants, there were also
diﬀerences in the transaction costs in the ISO and PX markets that initially favored trading in the ISO.
Despite these costs, which BBKW (2004) discusses in more detail, the bulk of energy was still traded
in the PX, indicating that the institutional barriers, both real and perceived, and underlying beneﬁts of
forward trading outweighed the transaction cost diﬀerential.
13Note that this discussion relies on there being a suﬃcient number of competitive entities able to take
advantage of any spot/forward price diﬀerences. It does not rely on perfect competition in the production
of electricity. Even if considerable market power exists in the electricity supply, we would still expect no
systematic price diﬀerence between forward and expected spot prices if both markets continue to support
signiﬁcant volume.9
time it is in eﬀect. The deviation, t−jPt−tPt, will have a distribution with a mean of zero
and will be orthogonal to all information available at time t − j.
We can rewrite (1) as,
tPt =t−j Pt + εt, (2)
where εt is a random variable that has mean zero and is uncorrelated with Ωt−j. That
is, εt incorporates all of the shocks to the market that occur between t − j and t. This
implies, as has been the case in California and elsewhere, the variance of the spot price
will be larger than the variance of the forward price.
It is worth noting that we do not assume any particular relationship with regard to the
intertemporal patterns of electricity spot prices. Intertemporal arbitrage through storage is
extremely costly in electricity markets, because electricity is not storable. While there are
technologies to store potential energy, for instance by charging a battery or pumping water
uphill, these methods are quite expensive and ineﬃcient, usually losing more than 50% of
the energy stored. For these reasons, it is common for electricity prices to ﬂuctuate by as
much as 300% or more within a day without creating proﬁtable intertemporal arbitrage
opportunities.
Monthly averages of the PX and ISO prices for the NP15 (North) and SP15 (South)
zones are plotted in Figures 1a and 1b, and Table 1 provides summary statistics over the
entire sample. Our sample period begins with the opening of the markets on April 1, 1998
and ends on November 30, 2000, the last month in which the PX could be considered fully
functional.
Equation (2) in our application can be written as ISOt = PXt + εt. We test for
convergence by estimating the model:
ISOt − PX t = α + εt (3)
If the PX price is an unbiased forecast of the ISO price then α = 0. We begin by estimating
equation (3), allowing each month to have a diﬀerent intercept, for zones NP15 and SP15.
There is good reason to think that shocks to the price diﬀerences between the PX and
ISO prices were serially correlated, and empirical tests conﬁrm that they were. Because
the PX prices in a given day were all set at the same time, the errors in (3) are almost
certain to be correlated across the hours in a day.
At 7:00 am each day PX participants submitted supply and demand bids for the 24
hour period beginning with the midnight-1:00 am hour of the following day. Because PX10
prices were determined in 24-hour “blocks,” shocks to either supply or demand (such as
weather changes) that take place after PX prices were determined can have an impact on
each ISO—PX price diﬀerence within a “block.” Since these shocks are serially correlated,
the ISO—PX price diﬀerences also will be serially correlated, implying the standard errors
obtained from ordinary least squares will be biased.14 It is important to note that this
institutional environment implies that even in an eﬃcient market ISO—PX price diﬀerences
are likely to be serially correlated.
Because of the timing of the PX market, the exact serial correlation structure that one
would expect is quite complex. In the appendix, we describe the full correlation structure
and two methods we used in attempting to estimate it. Unfortunately, neither approach
proved tractable.
We present a simpliﬁed alternative approach. We have averaged the price diﬀerences
for the early and later parts of each day, using one observation per day for each. An
“early” observation is the average ISO-PX price diﬀerence for hours 1-6, while a late
observation is the average ISO-PX price diﬀerence for hours 8-24. By our discussion above,
the regressions for the ﬁrst 6 hours of the day would, in a fully eﬃcient market, exhibit
no serial correlation, while the regressions for hours 8-24 would have errors that follow an
MA(1) process.15 We drop hour 7, because it is the hour in which market participants
generally submit bids; it is unclear whether the ISO-PX price diﬀerence during hour 7
would be correlated across days in an eﬃcient market.
We estimate equation (3) for early and late observations using separate constant terms
for each month, which indicate the average price ISO-PX diﬀerences for that month during
the hours examined. Tables 2 and 3 present the results of this analysis for the North and
South, respectively, including the Newey-West standard errors of the estimates, and the
estimated price diﬀerence as a proportion of the average PX price during the same hours.16
The shaded areas highlight p-values that indicate the estimates are signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. The coeﬃcients demonstrate that PX prices were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from ISO
prices during the majority of months during 1998, except in the South during the later
14For example, if a summer day turns out to be hotter than was forecasted when PX prices were
determined, the ISO—PX errors are all likely to be positive and therefore correlated.
15When we estimate the MA(1) error process as part of GLS estimation, the moving-average coeﬃcients
are indeed much greater and more statistically signiﬁcant in the late hours: Early North 0.26 (0.04); Early
South 0.07 (0.11); Late North 0.42 (0.06); Late South 0.48 (0.07). We have also run regressions using
overall daily averages, which yield qualitatively similar results.
16We estimate by OLS and report Newey-West standard errors (assuming an MA(1) error process for
both early and late regressions), rather than using a GLS procedure that corrects for an MA(1) error
process, because there is also substantial heteroskedasticity. The error variance is much greater during
months of high average prices.11
hours. After that, until May 2000, prices were less likely to diﬀer consistently over a month
and appeared to be converging. Beginning in May 2000, particularly in the North, price
started to be consistently higher in the ISO. The magnitudes of the diﬀerences were also
substantial, both overall and as a fraction of the ISO price levels.17
3.1 Trading Rules Based Only On Prior Information
While the results presented thus far suggest that there have been signiﬁcant diﬀerences be-
tween the PX and ISO prices in certain months, no distinct pattern emerges. For instance,
in the ﬁrst four months of trading, ISO prices were lower in both the North and South
during both the early hours (1-6) and late hours (8-24), although the negative coeﬃcients
were only statistically signiﬁcant in three out of the eight late-hour speciﬁcations. In the
next four months of trading, most coeﬃcients are positive, though there are several months
when this is not true in the South during early hours. It is unclear from the results pre-
sented so far whether a trader would have been able to capitalize on the signiﬁcant price
diﬀerences we ﬁnd. To gain insight on that question, we consider some simple trading
rules and evaluate whether they would have made money during the period when the PX
and ISO were both fully functional.
The trading rules we consider assume that a trader uses recent ISO—PX price diﬀer-
ences to guide trading decisions. The ﬁrst simple rule assumes that during every week
a trader makes purchases in one of the markets and equal-size sales in the other based
on which market had the lower average price in the previous week. We assess whether
this trading rule would have made money in the hands of a pure speculative trader, who,
unconstrained by institutional barriers, could have bought in the market he believed would
be less expensive and sold in the more expensive market. For instance, a trader following
our rule in either zone would have used the estimates from the ﬁrst week of April 1998,
suggesting that the ISO prices were lower, to sell in the PX and buy in the ISO during
the second week of April 1998. We consider whether this strategy, implemented from the
second week of April 1998 through November 2000, would have made money.
We consider a very simple form of the test that uses the prediction from the previous
week regardless of the statistical signiﬁcance of the price diﬀerence. We test this by
constructing a variable that is equal to one if the ISO price was higher in the previous
17An alternative approach often applied in the international trade literature is to look at the rate at
which prices in geographically separate markets converge by estimating the change in the price diﬀerential
between markets as a function of the level of the price diﬀerential. See Parsley and Wey (1996). When
applied to our data, this yields qualitatively similar results to our monthly eﬀects.12
week, so that the trading rule indicates that the trader should buy in the PX and sell
in the ISO and negative one if the trading rule indicates purchases should be made in
the ISO and sales in the PX.18 Table 4 summarizes the coeﬃcients and t-statistics from
including this variable in a speciﬁcation of equation (3) without any month dummies. The
ﬁrst row reports results from speciﬁcations that included the entire sample period, while
the remaining rows report tests during four separate time periods. Considering the entire
time period, the t-statistics are greater than 2 in all speciﬁcations except the late hours
in the South, suggesting that the simple trading rule produces positive and statistically
signiﬁcant proﬁts for three out of four hour-zone combinations. For instance, the trader
would have made an average proﬁt of $7.99 per MWh traded in the North during early
hours. Figure 2 plots the cumulative daily proﬁts from the trading rules. The results
suggest that a trader would have made considerable proﬁts and would never have negative
cumulative proﬁts. We have also carried out the equivalent test for a trading rule that uses
bi-weekly and monthly periods. The results were fairly similar; in all cases, the trading
rule produced statistically and economically signiﬁcant proﬁts over the sample period in
the North. In the South, over the entire sample the results are signiﬁcant for the early
period, but not for the late period.19
4 Explaining Forward-Spot Price Diﬀerences
The results thus far suggest that signiﬁcant price diﬀerences persisted between the PX
and the expected ISO prices, and that simple trading strategies would have made money.
This section considers several possible explanations for the diﬀerences. We ﬁnd that two
common explanations for the existence of forward-spot price diﬀerences even in completely
competitive markets — risk aversion and diﬀerential trading costs across markets — are not
consistent with the data. We then examine explanations in which some ﬁrms exercise
market power in the arbitraging function.
18We assume that the trader trades an equal quantity each hour.
19The trading rule approach takes into account both the serial correlation of the average price diﬀerence
over the rule periodicity and the magnitude of the average diﬀerence. Another approach that may be
more intuitive is a simple “runs test” to see if the weekly (or bi-weekly, or monthly) pattern of the sign of
ISO—PX could be distinguished from a random pattern. We ran such runs tests for the early and late time
periods for both the South and North markets, looking at weekly and monthly periodicity. The results
reject randomness in all markets and time periods except for the south in the early period prior to May
2000.13
4.1 Risk Aversion
Persistent diﬀerences between a forward and spot price could reﬂect risk aversion on the
part of market participants. The conditions under which this will occur, however, are
actually rather restrictive and the direction in which this would change the ISO—PX price
relationship is ambiguous. So long as there are a signiﬁcant number of competitive risk
neutral buyers or sellers, these players would cause the forward and expected spot prices
to converge, regardless of the degree of risk aversion among other participants.
In fact, risk neutrality, or near risk neutrality, may be a fairly accurate description of
many of the players in the PX and ISO. The returns to speculative trades on the ISO—PX
price diﬀerence had essentially no correlation with an investment in the market portfolio,
so the risk associated with them could be diversiﬁed away. A regression of the ISO—PX
price diﬀerence on a constant and the same-day return on the S&P 500 index cannot reject
that the price diﬀerence has a β of zero.
Even if the risk associated with betting on the ISO—PX price diﬀerence is diversiﬁable,
however, behavioral models of investor decisions suggest that some positive net-present-
value investments will be passed over if the variance of the returns, relative to their mean,
is high compared to alternative investments.20 We compared the risk-return properties of
speculation on the ISO—PX price diﬀerences to investing in an S&P 500 index fund by
computing the Sharpe ratio for the trading rules discussed in the previous section.21
Calculating the Sharpe ratio requires deﬁning the time period over which returns are
computed. We calculate the Sharpe ratio of the weekly trading rule using weekly returns.
In addition, we assume that the trader trades a total of one megawatt during each period
(“early” or “late”) equally weighted across hours of the period. For example, a trader using
the trading rule for Northern California ISO and PX prices in hours 8 to 24 would trade
1/17th of a megawatt each hour. Therefore, the weekly return is calculated as follows:
20See, for example, Chapter 7 in Lyons (2001). In this case, a focus on the risk-return of this trading
strategy in isolation could result from agency issues: the trader engaging in such strategies might be
judged on the outcome of these trades regardless of their covariance with other investments.
21The Sharpe ratio measures the ratio of the excess return relative to a benchmark security divided by
the standard deviation of the excess return. See Sharpe (1994).14
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The Sharpe ratio is based on the mean and standard deviation of these returns.22 As a
comparison, we also calculated the Sharpe ratio for someone trading in the S&P 500 over
the same time horizons. To calculate the earnings, we assume that a trader invests the
same amount of money in the S&P as she would have invested in the California electricity
market following our simple trading rule. For instance, during periods when the trader
buys in the ISO and sells in the PX, she invests an amount equal to the average price in
the ISO in the S&P 500 and then sells the shares at the end of the period.23
Table 5 lists the Sharpe ratios for the weekly trading rules.24 The table illustrates
that the returns from the trading rule were not the result of excess risk. In each period,
the Sharpe ratios are considerably larger than those in the S&P 500. Speculating on the
ISO—PX price diﬀerence had a much better return/risk ratio than investing in an S&P 500
index.
4.2 Estimation Risk
In demonstrating both that there were systematic patterns of ISO—PX price diﬀerences
and that simple trading rules would have been proﬁtable, we used the entire sample from
April 1998 to November 2000. In any new market, it may take participants time to learn
about how market rules, market fundamentals and their own behavior aﬀect prices. One
might then ask how rapidly a trader could learn of the proﬁtability of a trading rule during
the sample period.
To investigate this issue, we re-ran the tests for the proﬁtability of trading rules on a
rolling basis using only the data available at diﬀerent points in the sample. For example,
22During two weeks in the south, during the early hours and one week in the north, during early hours,
the average ISO price was negative at a time that the rule implied purchase from the ISO, so the trading
rule would imply a negative investment. We drop these weeks from the Sharpe ratio calculation, since
they imply in eﬀect inﬁnite positive returns. Dropping these observations biases downward the ratios.
23We used the trading rules and prices for the late hours in the North to determine the amount invested
in the S&P. The results are virtually the same if we use a diﬀerent zone/period or just equal investments
in all weeks.
24Sharpe ratios based on the monthly trading rules were very similar.15
using the “last week” trading rule, we could ask how certain a trader could be of the
proﬁtability of the rule after, for example, ﬁve weeks of market operation. In that case
the trader would have ﬁve weeks of data, of which the ﬁrst week does not contribute
observations because there is no prior week outcome on which to base trades. Running the
regression for the 28 days in this sample (days 8 through 35), we would ﬁnd a p-value of
0.14 on the test of the proﬁtability of this rule. The level of certainty, however, increases
(p-value drops) rapidly with a few more weeks of data. Figure 3 shows the p-value of
the “last week” trading rule for the four zone/time combinations. In all four cases, it is
clear that a trader considering this rule would have been more than 95% certain of its
proﬁtability by week 10, and would have been virtually certain of its proﬁtability by week
20.25
4.3 Transaction Costs Within and Between Markets
Eﬃcient price convergence between forward and spot markets can fail to occur if there are
diﬀerential costs associated with contracting in either market. Absent other incentives,
o n ew o u l de x p e c ta l lv o l u m et ob et r a d e di nt h el o w e rc o s tm a r k e t .
This may not occur, however, because either legal or political considerations constrain
one or both parties, or because one or both parties receive other beneﬁts from trading in
the higher cost market, such as faster or easier settlements or more user-friendly bidding
or dispatch rules. In that case, the price diﬀerence between the markets will depend on
the incidence of the trading cost.
To illustrate this with a simple example, assume that the trading cost in the spot
market is Cs = 1 and the trading cost in the forward market is Cf =2 .50. Absent
other considerations, we would expect traders to abandon the forward market and make
all transactions in the spot market. Now assume that buyers are constrained to buy the
bulk of their power in the forward market, while sellers are completely indiﬀerent between
the markets.26 Sellers must be induced to trade in the forward market, so the net price
they receive must be as high as in the spot market. If the buyer paid the trading charge
in each market, then the price in the spot market would have to equal the price in the
forward market in order to induce sellers to do business in the forward market. The buyers,
however, would pay that price plus Cf. If the charge were assessed on sellers, then the
25With the monthly trading rule, inference of proﬁtability is only slightly slower and the rule’s perfor-
mance becomes less reliable for late-South near the end of the dataset.
26This is not intended to be a characterization of the California market. The actual incentives in the
California market were much more complex.16
price in the forward market would have to exceed the price in the spot market by 1.50, so
that the sellers would be indiﬀerent between the markets.
In reality, if both markets survive even though they have diﬀerent direct trading costs,
it is likely because both parties get some additional beneﬁts from the higher direct-cost
market. The diﬀerence in the direct trading costs is likely to then be a bound on the
extent to which the prices in the two markets can diﬀer. The incidence of the diﬀerence
between the trading charges will be shared between the buyers and sellers depending on
which side, on the margin, gets greater value from trading in the higher cost market.27
The ISO—PX price diﬀerences that we’ve found are diﬃcult to square with an explana-
tion of diﬀerential trading costs for two reasons. First, the direction of the price diﬀerence
changes numerous times during the period we study while there is little evidence that
the relative cost of transactions in the two markets changed signiﬁcantly, and no evidence
that changes in the forward premium or discount is associated with changes in relative
transaction costs.28 Second, the price diﬀerences that began in May 2000 are far in excess
of the magnitudes of transaction costs. We know of no evidence that transaction costs
in either market changed substantially at the beginning of summer 2000, and the trading
costs are so small that our results remain largely unchanged when we adjust the prices to
reﬂect the trading costs imposed in the two markets (see BBKW (2004)).
4.4 Market Power in Arbitrage and Barriers to Entry
We have established that (1) there were proﬁtable (in expectation) risky arbitrage oppor-
tunities between the ISO and PX power markets using simple trading rules, (2) that the
risk associated with these trades was not great compared to the potential return and was
diversiﬁable, (3) that it should have been apparent to traders early in the life of the market
that these arbitrage opportunities existed, and (4) that transaction costs do not seem to be
a viable explanation for the persistence of these price diﬀerences. Thus, it seems unlikely
that outcomes we observed could be explained as part of a competitive ﬁnancial market
for power. In this section, we discuss evidence on the market power and incentives of three
types of parties that could have proﬁted from the ISO—PX price diﬀerences: electricity
buyers, electricity sellers and arbitrageurs.
Electricity Buyer Market Power
27It is possible that traders on one side will strictly prefer the market with the lower direct trading
costs, even before accounting for the trading costs, in which case the equilibrium price spread between the
markets could be greater than the diﬀerence in trading costs.
28BBKW (2004) discusses in more detail the diﬀerences in trading costs between the two markets.17
Among the “physical” players in a position to take advantage of ISO—PX price diﬀer-
ences were the three utilities that accounted for most of the demand in the market. The
utilities were expected to purchase the bulk of their demand (as forecasted a day ahead of
time) through the PX and use the ISO to cover imbalances caused by last-minute demand
shocks. Though no attempt was ever made to penalize the utilities for using the ISO
market, there was a common perception that they should not make signiﬁcant purchases
of forecastable demand in real time.
Prior to the spring of 2000, the utilities also had little incentive to attempt to reduce
their aggregate purchase costs by moving purchases between the markets, but that changed
around May 2000. To understand why, one needs to understand the Competition Transi-
tion Charge (CTC). The CTC was a surcharge on all power that was designed to allow the
utilities to recover losses that were incurred when their capital stock of generation plants
was eﬀectively devalued by the deregulation process, called “stranded costs.” Each utility
was assigned a total stranded costs that it was allowed to recover through the CTC. Each
utility was allowed to collect a CTC surcharge on power sold to all customers in its service
area until either it recovered its stranded costs or until March 2002, whichever came ﬁrst.
The CTC surcharge, however, was not a ﬁxed amount per kilowatt-hour. Instead, the
law ﬁxed the retail price utilities charged for energy (at about 6 cents per kWh equal to
$60/MWh). The diﬀerence between the retail revenue earned at the ﬁxed retail price and
the wholesale cost of electricity was the CTC payment to the utility.
The incentives that stranded costs recovery through the CTC created depended very
much on whether the utility thought the March 2002 cutoﬀ date would be a binding
constraint. When wholesale prices were low in 1998 and 1999, the CTC recovery payment
was high, and most observers believed that the utilities would collect their total stranded
costs prior to the March 2002 cutoﬀ. In fact, SDG&E, the smallest of the utilities, did
complete its stranded cost recovery in June 1999, after which the retail price freeze ended
for SDG&E customers and the utility was allowed/required to pass through changes in
wholesale purchase costs.29 So long as the utilities believed that the March 2002 cutoﬀ
would not be binding, they had little incentive to try to minimize their purchase cost.
Reductions in the wholesale price would only have sped up collection of their CTC and
would not have increased the total amount collected.30
29Actually, in late August 2000, the State passed legislation reimposing a ﬁxed retail rate on SDG&E,
but also made it clear that SDG&E would be made whole for any losses it suﬀered as a result of this
change. See Bushnell & Mansur (2005) for further details.
30The only beneﬁt from reducing the wholesale price, therefore, was the interest gained from collecting
this money sooner. Given that interest rates were low, this probably was a weak incentive.18
All that changed around June 2000. When wholesale prices increased to well above
$60/MWh in June 2000, PG&E and SCE began collecting “negative CTC payments.”
In other words, they were losing money on each kilowatt-hour sold, which made it much
more likely that the March 2002 cutoﬀ for stranded cost recovery would have been binding.
With a binding date cutoﬀ of the CTC, utility shareholders become the residual claimants
on any reduction of power procurement costs prior to March 2002. Thus, the increase in
price levels gave the utilities stronger incentives to lower their procurement costs.
Though the three utilities were major buyers in the power market, their market shares
did not give them monopsony power in the traditional sense, since the utilities in their
role as distributor had no control over the aggregate quantities of end-use consumption.
They did, however, have discretion over the market in which the power was purchased.
Because the supply curve in the PX was upward sloping, if a utility shifted some of its
purchases from the forward market to the spot market, and this shift was not anticipated
by suppliers, it would lower the forward price.31 In a very simple model, the move would
not change the ISO real-time price because the ultimate level of demand would not be
altered; the intersection of the market level (or “physical”) supply curve and the demand
would be unchanged.
This logic is depicted graphically in ﬁgures 4 and 5. In ﬁgure 4, the expected total
retail electricity demand is represented by the inelastic demand curve ¯ Q and the market
level supply curve is represented by the upward-sloping supply curve S. The market is in
equilibrium with the forward price equal to the expected spot price and no net transactions
occuring in the real-time market. Deviations between the forward and spot prices occur
only when the inelastic demand diﬀers from its forecasted level. For example, if the real-
time demand level is lower than forecasted, then the net quantity transacted in the spot
market will be negative and the market will move down the market supply curve resulting
in a spot price that is lower than the forward price. Conversely, if there is a positive shock
to demand, the spot price will be greater than the forward price.
31Why the PX supply curve was upward sloping is a question we don’t attempt to answer here. If all
bidders had symmetric expectations about the spot price, were risk neutral and faced no penalty for using
the spot market, the PX would eﬀectively be a ﬁnancial forward market and participants would stand
ready to buy or sell at their expected spot price with inﬁnite elasticity. Risk aversion on the part of some
buyers and sellers would lead to upward-sloping supply and downward-sloping demand in the PX, even
though the presence of other risk-neutral ﬁrms could be expected to eliminate price diﬀerences. Similarly,
a penalty or tax on real time transactions would do so as it would in a sense move “physical” transactions
into the forward market. In order to have this eﬀect, the penalty would have to be non-linear in the size
of the real-time transaction. This includes policies that ignore a modest reliance on the real-time market
but react to signiﬁcant real-time volumes.19
In ﬁgure 5, there is an unanticipated decrease in the forward market demand repre-
senting the decision of a buyer (such as one of the utilities) to shift γ units of demand
from the forward market to the spot market. This is accompanied by an unanticipated
increase in the spot market demand. The forward price is reduced. Because ﬁnal demand
and supply remain unchanged, the spot market price is unchanged. Alternatively, if some
generation is available only at higher cost in real time — for instance, because there is a
(possibly implicit) penalty for large sales in the real-time market — then this strategy could
increase the ISO price. Still, the net impact could be to reduce procurement costs if the
savings from the price reduction on a large purchase quantity in the PX were greater than
the increased cost on the price increase on a comparatively small purchase quantity in the
ISO.
There is strong documentary and empirical evidence that PG&E attempted just such a
strategy by moving demand out of the PX. For instance, in a subsequent regulatory ﬁling,
they described this strategy and explained that “paying a higher price in the ISO market
for the incremental portion of total load [demand] was more economical than bidding
higher prices into the PX market and paying a much higher price in the PX for every MW
purchased” in that market.32
Figure 6 helps identify the timing of PG&E’s attempt to move demand out of the
forward market. It plots the fraction of each of the three utilities’ total end use demand
that they bid into the forward market at or above the eventual ISO price.33 SCE and
SDG&E both consistently bid 70%-80% of their demand into the PX, while the fraction
that PG&E bid in began declining in May 2000 and fell from averaging about 80% in
January-April 2000 to about 50% in August through November 2000. Figure 7 highlights
diﬀerences among the demand curves the utilities bid in the PX. PG&E and SDG&E
both bid downward sloping demand curves into the PX, while SCE bid nearly completely
inelastic demand curves. As market prices rose through summer 2000 for the reasons
discussed above, the market equilibrium shifted along PG&E’s and SDG&E’s demand
curves. SDG&E oﬀset this by shifting their demand curve out between June and August
2000. PG&E did not do this; in fact it shifted its demand slightly inward. As a result,
PG&E purchased less and less through the PX market.34
32See PG&E (2002), p.009.
33We use the ISO price in order to control for changes in cost and supply conditions that aﬀect the
“relevant” part of the utilities’ demand curves. We use the ISO price in the north for PG&E and the ISO
price in the south for the other two utilities.
34The abrupt ﬂattening of the utilities’ August demand curves at $250, most notable for PG&E, reﬂects
their rational response to the lower ISO price cap of $250, which became eﬀective August 8th, 2000. Even
though PG&E’s PX demand ﬂattens more than the other utilities’ near the ISO price cap, and the price20
The relationship between ISO and PX prices changed markedly in May 2000, consistent
with a change in PG&E’s buying strategy. Beginning in May 2000, PX prices in the North
averaged substantially below ISO prices (see ﬁgure 1a), with the diﬀerence becoming still
larger in July 2000. Prices in the South exhibited much less change; the PX prices averaged
only slightly lower than the ISO in SP15 (see ﬁgure 1b).
All of our evidence suggests that PG&E pursued the monopsony strategy but SCE did
not. There is no record indicating why they did not, but it is possible that the presence
of SDG&E as an additional buyer in the south made it harder for them to move the PX
price. Also, SCE could free ride oﬀ of PG&E’s strategy as it beneﬁtted from the lower PX
prices without having to pay the higher ISO price on any of its own purchases.35 Because
SDG&E had completed its collection of stranded costs by 2000 and thereafter passed its
purchase costs through to retail customers, SDG&E faced much less incentive to minimize
its purchase costs.
Market Power of Arbitrageurs
The strategy discussed in the previous section relies on the shift in demand across mar-
kets being unanticipated. It is clear that at least some ﬁrms operating in the market knew
of the predictable forward/spot price diﬀerences and devised strategies to arbitrage the
price diﬀerences. Since ﬁrms that had no physical supply nor served any end-use demand
were not supposed to trade in the ISO market, pure arbitrageurs were technically not
allowed.36 However, several parties, most famously Enron, traded large amounts beyond
their physical positions in the markets.
Enron’s activities illustrate the possible strategies. Enron’s physical presence in Cal-
ifornia included the power from the generation assets that their subsidiary in Oregon,
Portland General Electric, regularly exported to California and the obligations that their
subsidiary Enron Energy Services (EES) had to meet the demand of several large buyers,
including the University of California, who had opted to leave the utilities and buy power
from EES. To take advantage of the fact that ISO prices were consistently higher than PX
prices after May 2000, EES could overstate their demand in the PX market. They could
then sell in the ISO market the diﬀerence between what they bought in the PX and what
cap was sometimes binding, the pattern in ﬁgure 7 is very similar if we drop those hours.
35We have been told by SCE oﬃcials that they considered a strategy of bidding so as to purchase a
substantial fraction of their forecast demand in the CAISO real time market, but rejected it because they
concluded that it would be in violation of the spirit, and possibly the letter, of the market rules.
36Traders could get around the restrictions to only make physical trades by scheduling power to be
supplied or consumed at “import” interfaces with neighboring regions. The California ISO had limited
ability to monitor the production or consumption activity outside its own control area.21
they actually needed to meet demand of customers. Enron internal memos released to the
FERC described this as the “Fat Boy” trading strategy (see Yoder and Hall, 2000). Other
documents describe the reverse strategy as “Thin Man”: when the PX price was expected
to be higher than the ISO, Enron would schedule more generation than it intended to
provide through the PX and then buy it back through the ISO.
Restricting the market to physical parties created one barrier to entering the ISO—
PX arbitrage business. In addition, there was ambiguity about whether arbitrage trades
violated ISO and PX rules. Among the parties that were allowed to trade in both the ISO
and the PX there could well have been either diﬀerences of opinion about how to interpret
the rules or diﬀerent valuations of the risks associated with skirting the rules. Rules for
traders in the PX and ISO were collected in their Market Monitoring and Information
Protocols (MMIP), and included general prohibitions against “gaming” and “anomalous
market behavior,” which it deﬁnes as including, “bidding patterns that are inconsistent
with prevailing supply and demand conditions” (California ISO, MMIP, 2.1.1.4). Enron
was aware of these provisions, as they are described in Yoder and Hall (2000). By June
2000, the parties had reason to believe that the ISO would not penalize “overscheduling
demand” (i.e., purchasing more power forward than the retailer believed it would need in
real time) since the ISO was more concerned about PG&E’s “underscheduling.” One party,
Reliant, claimed that the ISO took actions to assist Reliant in overscheduling demand
through the PX (see FERC, 2003, p. VI-24).
After the release of the Enron memos, FERC initiated an investigation of trading
strategies in the California markets. Two interesting facts have come out of this investi-
gation: Arbitrage proﬁts were concentrated between Enron and one other large ﬁrm with
possible ties to Enron, and Enron took steps to coordinate arbitrage trades among market
participants. This suggests that the ambiguity in the rules governing arbitrage and the
restriction of physical players may have been suﬃcient to give Enron market power in the
arbitrage market.
Information on the concentration of arbitrage trades comes from an analysis that the
ISO staﬀ did of which parties beneﬁted from the “Fat Boy” strategy (California ISO,
2003). The report identiﬁes hours in which ﬁrms scheduled substantially more than their
actual demand (speciﬁcally, when forecast exceeded actual by more than 13% or by more
than 25MWs) and calculated the proﬁts they earned on the excess. Though 33 parties
earned more than $20,000 through overscheduling between January 1 and October 1,
2000, Enron trades accounted for about 28% of the volume of “Fat Boy” activity, and
Powerex, the marketing arm of BC Hydro, accounted for 15%. The Enron memos and other22
internal documents claim that Enron had assisted Powerex in making Fat Boy transactions
(see Yoder and Hall, 2000, p. 2), suggesting that they may have shared their strategy
with Powerex. Powerex has subsequently denied having such a relationship with Enron
(Peterson, 2002).
Internal Enron documents also suggest that Enron was attempting to coordinate arbi-
trage trades across parties, and had implemented speciﬁc proﬁt-sharing rules with other
parties. FERC (2003) cites sections of the Enron Services Handbook, which appears to
contain instructions to traders. Under a section, “Who do you call and what action to
take?” there are six parties listed under the Fat Boy transaction and instructions to the
Enron traders to tell them to “fake or increase load [demand]” in the PX. The sharing
rules for four of the six parties are straight 50-50 splits of proﬁts or losses, while the other
two have more complicated sharing rules.
The presence of arbitrageurs would mitigate the success of PG&E’s strategy and thus
reduce the price diﬀerence, but would not necessarily drive it to zero. Given the uniform
price auction in both the forward and spot market, proﬁts from the arbitrage trades were
equal to the price diﬀerence times the amount traded, implying that the proﬁt maximizing
trade would reduce the price diﬀerence, but not eliminate it. This is depicted in ﬁgure 8.
We begin with the same monopsony trade as in ﬁgure 5, but allow for an arbitrageur, with
no physical assets, to respond to the price diﬀerence by buying qa MWh of power in the
forward market. Because the arbitrageur cannot take delivery of the power, she is forced
to reverse her position in the spot market, which eﬀectively requires her to bid qa MWh
i nt h es p o tm a r k e ta tap r i c eo fz e r o .
By increasing the forward demand, the arbitrage trade increases the forward price, but
does not inﬂuence the spot price, since the ultimate demand level is unchanged. Therefore,
the price diﬀerence is reduced, but not eliminated. The optimal amount of the arbitrage
trade will depend on the shape of the supply curve and the size of the monopsony trade.37
In addition, greater competition in arbitraging would result in greater aggregate arbitrage
trades. At some point, we would expect the competitive pressures to eliminate the price
diﬀerence. In the case of the California electricity markets, the evidence suggests that the
arbitrage market was suﬃciently concentrated such that price diﬀerences remained.
37To see this, suppose the supply curve was quadratic in quantity, S = a + bQ + cQ2.I n t h i s c a s e
the forward price would be pf = a + b(Qf + qa)+c(Qf + qa)
2, while the spot price would be ps =
a + bQs + cQ2









;t h i si sa ni n c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fc, the curvature of the supply
function, and Qs − Qf.23
Seller Responses to Monopsony Strategy
Besides ﬁrms that took advantage of the price diﬀerence through ﬁnancial trades, we
would expect that ﬁrms with net sell positions in California would respond to PG&E’s
demand reduction strategy by selling more of their output in the ISO market. There
is documentary evidence suggesting that some of the suppliers did this. For example,
Williams Energy in its FERC disclosure in the Enron proceeding (see Williams 2002)
states that “unlike Enron, Williams has dispatch rights to generation assets in California
that enable it to sell power into the Real Time market. Thus Williams does not have
the incentives that were apparently driving Enron to schedule demand in the Day Ahead
schedule which it could cut to sell energy in the Real Time market. Williams could simply
sell its own generation in the Real Time market.”38
The migration of volume out of the PX undermined its viability. The PX suﬀered
another blow, which was ultimately fatal, when the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
announced a preliminary ruling in November and ﬁnal decision in December 2000 that
required the three California utilities to stop selling their own power through the PX.
Volume in the PX plummeted in December 2000 and January 2001. On January 31, 2001,
the California Power Exchange ceased operations of a day-ahead electricity market.
5 Conclusion
Proﬁtable arbitrage opportunities can persist in reasonably functioning ﬁnancial markets
if capital restrictions, limited information, and other more explicit barriers to trading
limit the number of traders. We have studied one case of this in the California electricity
market. Although the day-ahead market of the PX and the real-time market of the ISO
played very diﬀerent institutional roles, and operated under quite diﬀerent market rules,
they were fundamentally markets for the same product. The level of price convergence
between these two markets was therefore an indicator of the ability of ﬁrms to overcome
informational and institutional barriers to eﬃcient trade.
We have established that signiﬁcant price diﬀerences existed between the PX and the
ISO during several periods in the PX’s 32 months of operation, particularly during the
last seven months. Some trading strategies with positive expected return existed; these
38We have analyzed the PX bid curves of the deregulated suppliers. While there is some indication
that some of them were selling less through the PX especially by the fall of 2000, there are too many
confounding factorts — cost changes, contractual commitments, and the fact that many also had retail
power commitments — to conclude statistically that deregulated sellers as a group moved out of the PX.24
strategies were risky, but the risk was highly diversiﬁable and the expected return was
quite large in comparison to the risk.
From our analysis, one main explanation emerges for the persistent and unprecedented
diﬀerences between the ISO and PX prices during the summer of 2000. Several of the
traders in the market appear to have exercised market power in their trading positions.
We documented an attempt by the largest buyer of electricity, PG&E, to exercise a form
of monoposony power over these markets. We also presented data and internal company
memos suggesting that Enron made arbitrage trades to take advantage of the price diﬀer-
entials, and we demonstrated that an arbitrageur like Enron with market power may not
want to trade until the price diﬀerential disappears.
More traders, in hindsight, should have been able to proﬁt from these price diﬀerences,
undermining the price diﬀerentials. Why we did not observe this in the California markets
remains an open question. One plausible explanation is that the market rules provided
a barrier to entry for the types of trades that Enron used. Other potential arbitrageurs
may have been deterred by the market rules prohibiting traders from misrepresenting their
physical positions. It is also possible that the generators, who were earning extremely large
proﬁts as the overall market price level rose, perceived political constraints to earning
even more money from the markets by ﬂouting the rules and shifting more sales into
the ISO. A second explanation is that in the complex and frequently-disrupted California
electricity market, too few participants learned about the price diﬀerences fast enough for
prices to converge before the eventual demise of the day-ahead market. Unfortunately, the
documentary evidence provides much better insight into why some parties took certain
actions than into why others did not take those same actions.25
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Appendix: Correlation Structure of Hourly Price Diﬀerences
The timing of PX and ISO trading is described in the text. Because of the timing of the
PX market, the exact serial correlation structure that one would expect is quite complex.
We describe this below and then discuss two diﬀerent estimation approaches. Neither of
these estimation approaches were tractable. This led us to adopt the simpliﬁed approach
described in the text.
Let t = 1 represent the beginning of an arbitrary day (i.e. the 12:00 am—1 am hour).
The PX prices for t =1 ,...,24 are set conditional on the information set available at the
time the PX supply and demand bids were made, which is likely to be between 6:00 am and
7:00 am (hour 7) of the previous day, or at t = −17. Therefore the information available
at the time the PX market closed is Ω−17.39 At time t = 6, PX prices are calculated for
hours 25 to 48, but these prices are conditional on the information set Ω6. The process
continues ad inﬁnitum.
The consequence of this process when econometrically modeling the diﬀerence between
ISO and PX prices is that the serial correlation among the error terms is expected to be of
varying lengths, depending on the time of day of the observation. A shock that causes the
diﬀerence between the ISO and PX prices to diverge during the t = −16,...,0t i m ef r a m e
may continue to impact this diﬀerence for hours t =1 ,...,24(likely at a decreasing rate).
However, since PX prices at time t = 25 are set conditional on an information set that
takes into account any shocks that preceded t = 6, an eﬃcient market would imply that a
shock at t = −16,...,−1,0,1,...6 should not be correlated with the diﬀerence between the
PX and ISO price at t =2 5 . Also, it is likely that the level of correlation between prices
set on the same day will be larger than correlations between prices on successive days.
For instance, the correlation between the error in hour 1 and the previous hour (hour 24
from the previous day) is likely to be smaller than the correlation between hour 2 and
hour 1, because the latter were determined under the same information set. Thus, both
the number of lagged hours with which an error is likely to be correlated and the size of
that correlation with each lag will vary by hour of the day.
We can write the price diﬀerence as a moving average process that explicitly recognizes
the correlation with earlier hours. For each hour, we would expect correlation back to the
time at which the price was set for that hour, that is, 6am-7am of the previous day. We
can therefore write the process as:
39Because supply and demand bids may take some time to be formulated, we make the assumption that
they are made during the time period of 6:00 am to 7:00 am, and are therefore set conditional on the
information set available at t =6 .29


















Unfortunately, our attempts to estimate a model with varying moving average compo-
nents have not led to convergence. One can obtain consistent estimates of the standard
errors from OLS estimation based on the Newey-West (1987) procedure. This requires
modifying the standard Newey-West estimator to account for the variable lengths of cor-
relations. Unfortunately, the covariance matrix of the modiﬁed Newey-West estimators is
not guaranteed to be positive semi-deﬁnite, and indeed yielded imaginary standard errors
for some speciﬁcations.Table 1
Price Summary Statistics April 1998-November 2000 ($/MWh)
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
PX North 46.89 56.86 0.00 1099.99
PX South 44.30 58.83 0.00 750.00
ISO North 54.80 77.67 -325.60 750.00
ISO South 45.20 71.77 -428.15 750.00
ISO-PX North 7.92 52.57 -709.01 689.85
ISO-PX South 0.91 50.85 -709.01 688.93Table 2
Monthly ISO-PX Price Differences in NP15
Early Hours 1-6 Late Hours 8-24
Month OLS Coef Percent PX Percent ISO N-W SE N-W P-value OLS Coef Percent PX Percent ISO N-W SE N-W P-value
April, 1998 -3.484 0.239 0.314 1.807 0.054 -1.556 0.061 0.065 1.127 0.168
May -1.876 0.461 0.857 0.821 0.023 -2.860 0.189 0.234 1.428 0.045
June -1.153 0.434 0.766 0.461 0.013 -4.856 0.301 0.431 1.905 0.011
July -6.133 0.344 0.524 1.554 0.000 -4.203 0.109 0.122 4.555 0.356
August 0.280 0.012 0.012 1.215 0.818 9.206 0.204 0.169 4.519 0.042
September 3.517 0.147 0.128 1.040 0.001 8.255 0.217 0.178 4.301 0.055
October 8.922 0.381 0.276 1.208 0.000 6.776 0.230 0.187 1.263 0.000
November 3.717 0.155 0.134 1.180 0.002 3.108 0.109 0.098 0.833 0.000
December -3.681 0.134 0.155 2.444 0.132 0.432 0.014 0.014 2.266 0.849
January, 1999 -1.321 0.084 0.092 1.034 0.202 -2.194 0.092 0.101 0.689 0.001
February -1.052 0.079 0.086 0.568 0.064 0.178 0.008 0.008 0.478 0.710
March -1.934 0.140 0.163 0.931 0.038 1.218 0.056 0.053 1.033 0.238
April -0.273 0.016 0.016 0.852 0.749 1.787 0.067 0.063 2.637 0.498
May -2.364 0.170 0.205 1.190 0.047 -4.793 0.171 0.207 1.355 0.000
June -2.706 0.267 0.364 1.113 0.015 -2.007 0.067 0.072 3.607 0.578
July -11.289 0.585 1.409 4.662 0.016 -9.278 0.248 0.329 4.847 0.056
August -2.021 0.095 0.104 1.454 0.165 3.382 0.085 0.078 5.718 0.554
September 0.764 0.026 0.025 1.730 0.659 2.464 0.058 0.055 5.123 0.631
October -0.968 0.026 0.027 3.094 0.754 7.758 0.123 0.110 8.045 0.335
November 6.637 0.242 0.195 3.128 0.034 11.420 0.274 0.215 4.768 0.017
December 1.506 0.063 0.059 1.678 0.370 3.481 0.110 0.099 1.100 0.002
January, 2000 1.364 0.053 0.051 1.616 0.399 1.968 0.059 0.056 1.411 0.163
February 1.080 0.042 0.040 1.334 0.418 -1.203 0.038 0.040 1.437 0.402
March -2.039 0.092 0.102 1.157 0.078 1.785 0.059 0.056 1.372 0.193
April -1.714 0.115 0.130 2.062 0.406 3.100 0.101 0.092 3.768 0.411
May 14.348 0.575 0.365 3.820 0.000 6.546 0.117 0.105 11.080 0.555
June 11.805 0.228 0.186 7.156 0.099 3.966 0.025 0.025 31.250 0.899
July 22.663 0.458 0.314 9.693 0.020 36.134 0.357 0.263 12.072 0.003
August 41.223 0.476 0.323 5.447 0.000 54.344 0.331 0.249 12.819 0.000
September 56.180 0.683 0.406 10.471 0.000 68.311 0.572 0.364 9.125 0.000
October 42.986 0.513 0.339 7.613 0.000 39.985 0.370 0.270 5.402 0.000
November 33.580 0.224 0.183 11.229 0.003 25.448 0.142 0.124 8.864 0.004
Dependent variable is ISO-PX in NP15.  Standard errors reflect Newey-West correction with a one-day lag.Table 3
Monthly ISO-PX Price Differences in SP15
Early Hours 1-6 Late Hours 8-24
Month OLS Coef Percent PX Percent ISO N-W SE N-W P-value OLS Coef Percent PX Percent ISO N-W SE N-W P-value
April, 1998 -4.162 0.286 0.400 1.684 0.014 -1.578 0.062 0.066 1.126 0.162
May -1.876 0.461 0.857 0.821 0.023 -1.767 0.117 0.133 2.059 0.391
June -1.114 0.426 0.741 0.454 0.014 -4.994 0.307 0.443 1.799 0.006
July -5.794 0.332 0.497 1.595 0.000 -5.354 0.135 0.156 4.789 0.264
August -3.398 0.157 0.187 1.580 0.032 6.389 0.135 0.119 4.793 0.183
September -1.475 0.070 0.076 1.741 0.397 3.310 0.087 0.080 3.814 0.386
October 2.406 0.177 0.152 1.666 0.149 4.381 0.157 0.137 1.389 0.002
November 2.489 0.225 0.183 1.254 0.048 0.815 0.030 0.029 0.668 0.223
December -1.397 0.080 0.087 1.569 0.373 -0.275 0.009 0.009 2.149 0.898
January, 1999 -0.300 0.022 0.022 1.138 0.792 -2.009 0.085 0.093 0.694 0.004
February -1.030 0.078 0.084 0.566 0.069 0.171 0.008 0.008 0.478 0.721
March -1.110 0.086 0.094 0.946 0.241 1.274 0.058 0.055 1.016 0.210
April -0.273 0.016 0.016 0.852 0.749 1.679 0.063 0.059 2.647 0.526
May -2.330 0.168 0.202 1.181 0.049 -4.793 0.171 0.207 1.355 0.000
June -1.960 0.209 0.264 1.063 0.066 -1.965 0.066 0.071 3.637 0.589
July -7.089 0.469 0.885 4.083 0.083 -7.857 0.218 0.279 5.438 0.149
August -3.300 0.170 0.205 1.735 0.057 3.677 0.096 0.088 4.894 0.453
September -0.136 0.008 0.008 2.162 0.950 5.340 0.158 0.136 5.826 0.360
October -2.649 0.091 0.100 2.082 0.204 4.465 0.101 0.092 4.090 0.275
November -2.558 0.149 0.175 3.686 0.488 4.299 0.125 0.111 2.450 0.080
December 5.007 0.248 0.199 2.230 0.025 3.445 0.111 0.100 1.097 0.002
January, 2000 1.788 0.077 0.072 1.720 0.299 0.788 0.024 0.024 1.362 0.563
February 1.529 0.062 0.058 1.628 0.348 -2.035 0.064 0.069 1.508 0.177
March -1.736 0.083 0.090 1.283 0.176 0.268 0.008 0.008 1.279 0.834
April -1.356 0.093 0.103 1.958 0.489 9.648 0.263 0.208 7.601 0.205
May 10.849 0.455 0.313 2.969 0.000 16.162 0.247 0.198 14.170 0.254
June 16.686 0.469 0.319 5.467 0.002 0.081 0.001 0.001 28.928 0.998
July 3.567 0.082 0.076 5.565 0.522 7.747 0.059 0.056 12.146 0.524
August 21.395 0.399 0.285 6.072 0.000 -8.131 0.042 0.044 10.902 0.456
September 29.755 0.517 0.341 8.888 0.001 12.472 0.102 0.092 10.807 0.249
October -29.171 0.480 0.924 6.539 0.000 -16.409 0.172 0.207 6.541 0.012
November 7.075 0.083 0.077 11.267 0.530 -3.934 0.027 0.028 10.158 0.699
Dependent variable is ISO-PX in SP15.  Standard errors reflect Newey-West correction with a one-day lag.Table 4
PROFITABILITY OF WEEKLY TRADING RULES (average profit per MWh)
Epoch North Early North Late South Early South Late
All Months 7.99  8.54  3.53  1.72 
(7.96) (5.52) (4.69) (1.29)
April 8-Dec 31, 1998 3.09  3.21  1.37  1.90 
(5.73) (3.19) (2.60) (1.91)
Jan-Aug, 1999 1.59  0.71  0.60  0.77 
(2.05) (0.61) (0.88) (0.69)
Sept 1999-April 2000 0.54  1.93  0.68  3.38 
(0.72) (1.38) (0.88) (2.46)
May-Nov, 2000 29.87  31.68  12.79  0.68 
(8.30) (5.21) (4.31) (0.12)
T-statistics in parentheses reflect Newey-West correction with a one-day lag.Table 5: Sharpe Ratios for the Weekly Trading Rule
4/98- 1/99- 9/99- 5/00- Total
12/98 8/99 4/00 11/00 Sample
North — Early .73 .61 1.38 1.68 .71
North — Late .86 .97 .95 1.37 .97
South — Early .77 .92 .44 .65 .64
South — Late .80 .94 .90 1.02 .87
S&P 500 -.09 .13 .04 -.25 -.09Figure 1a













































































































PX Price NP15Figure 1b













































































































PX Price SP15Figure 2
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Unanticipated Decrease in Forward Demand
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Monopoly Arbitrage with Unanticipated Decrease in Forward Demand
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